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I.  Introduction: 
 
 
This symposium poses an interesting question: What's left of the law in the wake of 
ADR? I will address this question in the context of the criminal justice system in the United 
States. As with civil cases, few criminal cases go to trial. Negotiated agreements through plea 
bargaining have been the predominate form of case resolution since at least the mid-twentieth 
century.2 As criminal caseloads rose, trial rates decreased, as they did for civil cases.3  Today, 
only a small percentage of criminal cases go to trial.4  Plea bargaining, as with other forms of 
alternative dispute resolution, is an informal process that operates largely outside the formal legal 
system. Plea bargains are rarely negotiated on the record in open court. Instead, they are usually 
negotiated in private between the defense and the prosecution and only announced in open court 
and on the record once the deal is final and agreed to by all the parties. Does this mean the law 
is absent in the process? And, does plea bargaining work to undermine the formal criminal codes 
in the United States? The simple answer is that the formal criminal law provides the framework 
for how plea bargaining works and also acts as a substantial impediment to serious plea 
bargaining reform, an impediment that is often not recognized as scholars and practitioners focus 
on the fact that the plea bargaining process itself operates with few rules and constraints.5 
 
As with other dispute resolution processes, plea bargaining grew as a process largely 




1 Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. Thank you to Professors Nancy Welsh, Tania Sourdin, 
and Christopher Drahozal for their thoughtful comments and questions. Thank you to the Yearbook on Arbitration 
and Mediation for all of their hard work in organizing the 2015 Symposium. 
 
2 For example, in 1962 just 15.39% of defendants went to trial in U.S. District Courts, with 53% of those defendants 
having jury trials, the remaining were bench trials. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials 
and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 554 (2001). 
 
3 Id. at 492-98. 
 
4 92-97% of resolved criminal cases are resolved through plea bargaining. Missouri v. Frye 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 
(2012). 
 
5 An important article arguing for better regulation of plea bargaining is Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea- 
Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117 (2011) (cited in Lafler v. 
Cooper 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012)); see also Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law after Lafler and Frye, 51 
DUQ. L. REV. 595 (2013); Darryl K. Brown, Lafler, Frye and Our Still-Unregulated Plea Bargaining System, 25 
FED. SENT’G. REP. 131 (2012). 
 
6 See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 9-10 
(2003) (by the nineteenth century plea bargaining was the “dominant means of resolving criminal cases”). See also 
John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV 261 (1979). 
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Court recognized plea bargaining as constitutional.7  Since 1970, the Court and criminal codes 
have remained largely silent on the plea bargaining process itself. There are rules surrounding 
how a defendant should enter his plea of guilty on the record and in open court, but few 
limitations or rules on how prosecutors or defense lawyers can or should go about negotiating 
those plea deals.8  As a result, plea bargaining critics often focus on the shortage of law regulating 
plea bargaining and call for new rules and laws to make it a better regulated process.9        
However, as this article will discuss, plea bargaining is defined by the law, meaning that the law 
is an important factor, if not the most important factor, in plea negotiations and plea bargaining 
outcomes. Plea bargaining reform will therefore require substantive criminal law reform. This is 
not to suggest that substantive criminal law reform is all that is required to address the problems 
with plea bargaining, but rather that it is a key element that should be part of any meaningful 
reform effort.10 
 
Scholars have been highly critical of plea bargaining although it has been a part of our 
criminal justice system since the founding of this nation.11  One of the earlier debates in plea 
bargaining scholarship was whether to abolish plea bargaining entirely.12  A few jurisdictions 
experimented, without much success, with banning plea bargaining.13  Professionals in the 
criminal justice system are often not as critical of the process as scholars and instead often see 
plea bargaining as a practical process through which they can manage their high caseloads. 
Practitioners, therefore, often resist efforts to prevent the use of plea bargaining and find ways to 
continue plea bargaining cases.14  Not surprisingly, the need to efficiently manage caseloads is 





7 Brady v. United States 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1970). 
 
8 See discussion infra Section II. 
 
9 See, e.g., Bibas supra note 5. 
 
10 For a more detailed discussion of how complex plea bargaining is see generally Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 561 (2014). 
 
11 See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 6, at 9-10. 
 
12 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652 (1981), Albert W. 
Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992). 
 
13 For a discussion of the bans in Alaska and the Bronx see Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should We Really “Ban” Plea 
Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 774-779 (1998); for an example 
from another jurisdiction see generally Robert A. Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El 
Paso County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. REV. 265 (1987). 
 
14 See, e.g., Weninger, supra note 13, at 289-311 (judges routinely went around the ban. Id. at 306-08). 
 
15 See, e.g., Alkon, supra note 10, at 589-590 (“Judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys all rely on plea 
bargaining to manage their caseloads…[and] consider plea bargaining to be an indispensable part of how they do 
their jobs and manage work-life balance.” Id.). 
3   
Criminal justice reform in the 1970s and 1980s focused on being "tough on crime."16  As 
a result, laws were passed in every state, and federally, that increased punishments, added 
enhancements, and added mandatory sentencing provisions or guidelines.17 These increased 
penalties gave prosecutors even more power in the plea bargaining process.18 The dramatic 
increase in possible penalties exacerbated a longstanding concern of plea bargaining critics: that 
the plea bargaining process is coercive and may lead to innocent defendants pleading guilty. 
This problem became even more of a concern as penalties increased making the consequences of 
losing at trial worse.19 
 
A more recent wave of plea bargaining scholarship recognizes that plea bargaining is an 
entrenched part of the criminal justice system and focuses instead on how to reform it.20  This 
current wave of scholarship includes those who are critically examining plea bargaining after the 
Supreme Court started taking a greater interest in the process, starting in 2010 with Padilla v. 
Kentucky when the Court held that defendants have the right to be informed about the collateral 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea.21 Scholarly interest increased again when the Court 
decided the 2012 companion cases of Lafler v. Cooper22 and Missouri v. Frye23 when the Court 






16 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS, 
40-58 (2012). 
 
17 See, e.g., James Austin, et al., Unlocking America: Why and How to Reduce America’s Prison Population, THE 
JFA INSTITUTE 1, 4 (2007), http://www.jfa-associates.com/publications/srs/UnlockingAmerica.pdf. 
 
18 For a more extensive discussion of how the structure of the laws give prosecutors greater power in plea bargaining 
see Alkon, supra note 10, at 586-87. 
 
19 This is referred to as the trial penalty. See, e.g., Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: 
Differences in Sentences after Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 959, 992 (2005) (reporting trial penalties ranging from thirteen percent to four hundred sixty-one percent). 
 
20 See, e.g., Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Common Law of Plea Bargaining, KY. L. J. 2013-2014 at 1; Rishi 
Batra, Lafler and Frye: A New Constitutional Standard for Negotiation, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 309 
(2013); Stephanos Bibas, The Duties of Non-Judicial Actors in Ensuring Competent Negotiation, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 
625 (2013); Covey, supra note 5; Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains That Waive Claims of Ineffective Assistance— 
Waiving Padilla and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 647 (2013); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Indirect Potential of Lafler 
and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 633 (2013); Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 150 (2012); Stephanos Bibas, Taming Negotiated Justice, Yale L. J. Online (June 20, 2012); 
Wesley M. Oliver, The Present and Future of Plea Bargaining: A Look at Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, 
2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 257, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/supreme-court- 
review/2012/9/scr-2012-oliver.pdf. 
 
21 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 
22 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 
23 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
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Much of the most current scholarship on plea bargaining uses these recent Supreme Court 
cases, most notably Lafler and Frye to recommend further reforms to plea bargaining.24   
However, Padilla, Lafler, and Frye, were all cases in which the Court looked only at the question 
of whether there was competent assistance of counsel during the client-counseling phase of plea 
bargaining.25    The narrow focus of the Court in these cases has meant that many commentators 
and scholars have been similarly focused on the defense lawyer role in plea bargaining or how to 
provide better defense services.26  Some scholars have focused more generally on the need to 
reform plea bargaining by adopting more procedural rules.27  Undoubtedly improving defense 
services and improving the procedural framework are important areas for reform in the plea 
bargaining process. Yet, the current wave of scholarship often fails to recognize the importance 
of also reforming the substantive criminal law as a key component to meaningful plea bargaining 
reform. This is due, in part, to a failure by many critics and commentators to more fully examine 
bargaining behavior during plea negotiations and to their underlying assumption that plea 
bargaining is a process that exists outside the law instead of a process that is defined by the 
existing law. 
 
This article will begin, in Section II, with a brief explanation of the few rules that regulate 
the plea bargaining process. Section III will examine how plea bargaining works, focusing on 
how the substantive criminal law impacts bargaining behavior. Section IV will discuss the 
concern that plea bargaining is often overly coercive and how the substantive criminal law 
contributes to the coercive atmosphere. Section V will consider the classic article, The Shadow 
of the Law: The Case of Divorce28 and examine whether plea bargaining happens in the shadow 
of the law. This article will use the shadow of the law concept and build off the analysis from 
previous articles arguing that while plea bargaining is highly complex, it is time to reexamine 
how the substantive criminal law impacts plea bargaining behavior and the importance of 
substantive criminal law reform as part of the overall reform of the plea bargaining process. 
Section VI will propose that plea bargaining reform efforts should include efforts to reform the 
underlying criminal law using examples from California’s recent changes in the law to explore 







24 See note 20 for a listing of some of these recent articles. 
 
25 Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L. J. 2650, 2653 (2013). 
 
26 See, e.g., Laurence A. Benner, Expanding the Right to Effective Counsel at Plea Bargaining, 27 CRIM. JUST. 4 
(2012); Richard E. Myers II, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Rereading Cronic and Strickland in 
Light of Padilla, Frye and Lafler, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 229 (2012); Ronald Wright, Padilla and the Delivery of 
Integrated Criminal Defense, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1515 (2011). 
 
27 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 5; Oliver, Toward a Common Law of Plea Bargaining, supra note 20; Batra, supra 
note 20. 
 
28 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewish Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE 
L. J. 950 (1979). 
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II. The Laws Regulating Plea Bargaining 
 
Critics complain that the plea bargaining process operates too informally as there are few 
rules to regulate how the prosecution and defense negotiate plea deals.29  Historically, the 
Supreme Court has been more interested in regulating trials and less interested in plea 
bargaining.30  Despite its widespread use, it wasn’t until 1970 that the Supreme Court, in Brady 
v. United States, specifically recognized the constitutionality of plea bargaining.31  The Court has 
held that a guilty plea must be must be voluntary and intelligent.32  The Court has said this means 
that the defendant understands what he is doing, acts freely and knowingly, and accepts (or 
declines) a plea bargain without physical coercion.33  There are few constraints on how 
prosecutors approach plea bargaining.34 One exception is that prosecutors should not breach 
previous agreements.35  For example, the Court remanded a case when the prosecutor failed to 
stick to the original plea agreement after the defendant entered his plea of guilty36 as to do 
otherwise would be an “unfulfilled promise” or governmental deception.37  The court has not 
considered threats of worse punishment or additional charges to be illegal coercion. For  
example, in Brady, the Court decided that the defendant deciding to take the deal to avoid the 
death penalty was not a violation.38 In Brady the Court held that the defendant accepted the deal 




29 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 5; Susan R. Klein, Plea Bargaining after Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 559 
(2013). 
 
30 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 5, at 1123 (“The law of criminal procedure is primarily a law of trials and preparation 
for trials.”). 
 
31 Brady v. United States 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1970)(“[G]uilty pleas are not constitutionally forbidden.” Id.). 
 
32. Id. at 748. 
 
33. Id. at 748–50. 
 
34 See e.g., Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Power, Discretion, and Misconduct, 27-30, 23-SPG CRIM. 
JUST. 24 (2008) (a general discussion of prosecutorial discretion and why courts defer to prosecutors imposing few 
rules or constraints on the exercise of their discretion). 
 
35 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (The fact that the prosecutor who made the agreement is no 
longer handling the case does not change this as “[t]he staff lawyers in a prosecutor’s office have the burden of 
‘letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing’ or has done. That the breach of agreement was inadvertent 
does not lessen its impact.” Id. at 262). 
 
36   Id. (“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be 
said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Additionally, “appropriate 
recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be 
best served by remanding the case…”). 
 
37  Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 505 (1984) (distinguishing the facts from Santobello). 
 
38 397 U.S. at 755. 
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not accepted was not coercive because the death penalty could be lawfully imposed.39  The Court 
has also held that it is not a violation of due process if a prosecutor threatens to re-indict the 
defendant with more serious charges if he refuses the plea deal.40 In practice, as there are no   
rules to prevent it, prosecutors can (and do) threaten to add additional charges or enhancements if 
the defendant does not accept the plea deal.41  As will be discussed below, prosecutorial threats to 
add more charges or enhancements puts more pressure on defendants to accept deals as the 
consequences of failing to do so can be so much more serious.42  Threats of additional charges 
and enhancements increases the concern about the overall coercive atmosphere of plea bargaining 
including the reality that innocent defendants may plead guilty.43 
 
Just as the Court has had a very narrow reading of what is coercion in the plea bargaining 
context, the Court has considered plea deals “intelligent” even if the defendant lacks information 
about the evidence that will be admitted at trial against him or how that may impact his chances 
of conviction.44  In general, under Brady v. Maryland, the prosecutor must disclose “evidence 
favorable to the accused . . . where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.”45 
Brady, did not, however involve a plea bargain and the Court has not specified what evidence 
must be disclosed before a plea deal. In 2002, in U.S. v. Ruiz, the U.S. Supreme Court decided, 
in part, that a defendant did not have a constitutional right to impeachment information before 
entering a plea agreement.46  This creates a problem in that it may limit the leverage a defendant 
might have in plea negotiations, as impeachment evidence may help to secure a better deal. It 
also means that defendants may be accepting plea deals without ever knowing that they have this 
possible leverage.47  So far the Court has not held that there is a defense right to open-file 
discovery, which means that defendants are often entering guilty pleas without knowing all of  
the evidence the prosecution may have, including evidence that may increase their bargaining 




39 Id. at 751. 
 
40 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978). William Stuntz stated, “In retrospect, Bordenkircher 
appears to be one of the great missed opportunities of American constitutional law.” William J. Stuntz, 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes: The Rise of Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law (Harv. Pub. L. Working 
Paper No. 120, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=854284. 
 
41 See e.g., G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING, 87 (3rd ed. 2012). 
 
42 See infra Section V. 
 
43 See infra Section V; Alkon, supra note 10, at 595-605. 
 
44 397 U.S. at 757; see also United States v. Ruiz 536 U.S. 622 (2002). 
 
45 Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 
46 536 U.S. at 625. 
 
47 For a longer analysis of the problem of lack of defense discovery and a recommendation to adopt open file 
discovery law see generally Cynthia Alkon, The Right to Defense Discovery in Plea Bargaining Fifty Years after 
Brady v. Maryland 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 407 (2014). 
7   
exculpatory evidence as Brady v. Maryland clearly requires.48  Plea bargaining reform 
proponents, including myself, have called for open file discovery as one procedural rule to better 
protect defendants to ensure that they have all of the information in the case both to help in the 
negotiation process and in their decision-making about whether to accept the plea offer or not.49 
 
Since 2010, the Court has decided three cases involving plea bargaining that have helped 
to carve out some minimally better regulation in one part of the plea bargaining process: the 
client counseling phase.50  In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court held that the defendant has the right 
to be advised by his lawyer about the collateral immigration consequences of his guilty plea and 
that failure to do so is a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.51  In 2012, the Court 
decided the companion cases of Lafler v. Cooper52 and Missouri v. Frye.53  In Frye the Court 
held that the defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated when the 
defendant’s lawyer failed to convey a plea offer before it expired.54  In Lafler the defendant’s 
lawyer conveyed the offer, but wrongly advised his client that the prosecution “would be unable 
to establish intent to murder” because the victim was shot below the waist (despite being shot 
four times).55  This was so clearly incorrect that the parties on appeal agreed that the advice fell 
below the required “objective standard of reasonableness.”56  Based on this poor advice, the 
defendant turned down a plea deal that was over one-third less than his eventual sentence.57 
 
 
48 For example, the prosecution in the Michael Morton case failed to turn over exculpatory evidence, in violation of 
Brady. Michael Morton was wrongly convicted for murdering his wife and served twenty-five years in the Texas 
prison system. The prosecutor who failed to turn over the evidence, Ken Anderson, was later convicted and 
sentenced to ten days in jail for the violation of the law. For a longer discussion of the Michael Morton case see 
Alkon, supra note 47 at 419-21. 
 
49 See, e.g., Alkon, supra note 47; John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea 
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437 (2001). For articles more generally recommending open file discovery see Daniel S. 
Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533 (2010); Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory 
Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File 
Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257 (2008). 
 
50 Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2653 (2013). 
 
51 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). Bibas, supra note 5, at 1120 (“With Padilla, the Court has now begun 
to interpret due process and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to impose meaningful safeguards on the plea 
process.”). 
 
52 132 S. Ct. 1376. 
 
53 132 S. Ct. 1399. 
 
54 Id. at 1404. 
 
55 Id. at 1380. 
 
56 Id. at 1384 (“In this case all parties agree the performance of respondent’s counsel was deficient when he advised 
respondent to reject the plea offer on the grounds he could not be convicted at trial. In light of this concession, it is 
unnecessary for this Court to explore the issue.” Id.) 
 
57 Id. at 1383-84 (He rejected an offer of 51-85 months in prison (4.25-7.08 years) and was sentenced to 185-360 
months in prison (15.4 -30 years) after the jury convicted him at trial.). 
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There were no errors in the trial itself, but the Court concluded that the trial did not cure 
whatever problems may have occurred during the plea bargaining process and specifically said 
“[e]ven if the trial itself is free from constitutional flaw, the defendant who goes to trial instead 
of taking a more favorable plea may be prejudiced from either a conviction on more serious 
counts or the imposition of a more severe sentence.”58  The Court, thereby, recognized the fact 
that plea deals are often significant discounts from what a defendant will get if they go to trial 
and are convicted. 
 
Beyond these few constitutional requirements, there are statutory requirements. 
However, many of the statutory rules simply reflect the constitutional minimums that the Court 
has established and therefore concentrate on procedural issues.59  The rules surrounding plea 
bargaining do not focus on the negotiation process itself, but rather the formal process of the 
defendant entering a guilty plea and the court accepting it after the prosecution and defense have 
agreed on a deal.60  For example, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states what 
rights a judge must advise the defendant that he is waiving, and that the judge should get the 
factual basis for the plea.61  Rule 11 also states that the defendant should be advised about the 
charges, and the maximum and minimum penalties.62 There are also rules concerning what  
judges can and cannot do, for example, under the Federal Rules, judges cannot “participate” in 
plea negotiation discussions.63    The rules in state criminal procedure codes regarding plea 
bargaining also tend to focus more on the form of the guilty plea and procedures surrounding 
accepting the plea in court.64 
 
Many scholars calling for plea bargaining reform focus on the lack of regulation in the 
plea bargaining process. As Stafanos Bibas observed, “…a $100 credit-card purchase of a 
microwave oven is regulated more carefully than a guilty plea that results in years of 
imprisonment.”65  Bibas has been in the forefront in calling for better regulations and looking to 
other possible models such as consumer protection.66  Bibas’ recommendations include some 
specifically aimed at decreasing the potentially coercive atmosphere of plea bargaining. For 
 
 
58 132 S. Ct. at 1386. 
 
59 Bibas, supra note 5, at 1124. 
 
60 See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (holding that there needs to be a record to establish that the 
defendant voluntarily and knowingly entered his plea); Bibas, supra note 5, at 1124. 
 




63 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1); for a recent decision holding that a violation of this rule is not grounds to vacate a 
guilty plea see U.S. v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139 (2013). 
 
64 See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (West 2011). 
 
65 Bibas, supra note 5, at 1153. 
 
66 See generally Bibas, supra note 5, at 1151-1158. 
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example, Bibas recommends a “cooling-off period” for any plea deals involving five or more 
years of imprisonment.67  However, as will be discussed below, improving the procedural rules 
that surround plea bargaining, while important, will not fully address the concern that plea 
bargaining is unduly coercive because of the pressure prosecutors can put on defendants by 
threatening to apply the potentially severe penalties written into the criminal codes themselves. 
 
III. How Plea Bargaining Works: 
 
“Plea bargaining is a form of negotiation by which the prosecutor and defense counsel 
enter into an agreement resolving one or more criminal charges against the defendant without a 
trial.”68 There is no right to a plea bargain which means it is entirely within the discretion of the 
prosecutor to decide whether to offer a deal.69  If there is a plea deal, it is not final unless the 
judge agrees to accept it.70  There are three basic types of plea bargaining: charge bargaining, 
sentence bargaining and sentence recommendation agreements.71   In charge bargaining, the 
negotiation is about whether the prosecutor may agree to dismiss one or more of the charges or  
to not charge particular offenses in exchange for a guilty plea.72   In sentence bargaining the 
prosecution and defense negotiate about the sentence or punishment.73    Plea negotiations often 
include both sentence and charge bargaining.74   A third form of plea bargaining, sentencing 
recommendations agreements, is more common in the federal system and is when the prosecutor 
agrees to recommend a particular sentence to the judge. 75 
 
 
67 Bibas, supra note 5, at 1155. Nancy Welsh suggested a cooling-off period in mediation to help address concerns 
about coercive mediation practices (“muscle mediation”). Nancy Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination 
in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization? 6 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 1, 6-7 
(2001). 
 
68 HERMAN,  supra note 41 at 1. 
 
69 This does not mean that defendants must always go forward to trial, as the defendant may have the option to  
“plead open” to the court, leaving it to the judge to decide the sentence, with or without the benefit of a pre-arranged 
plea deal. However, if the defendant pleads open to the court he is “pleading to the sheet” meaning he will have to 
plead to all charges, as filed, as the judge will not be able to dismiss any charges or enhancements on her own 
motion. See, e.g., Eric M. Matheny, The Risks of Pleading Open to the Court, ERIC MATHENY L. BLOG (Mar. 3, 
2012,  12:55   PM),  http://www.ericmathenylaw.com/Criminal-Defense-Blog/2012/March/The-Risks-Of-Pleading- 
Open-To-The-Court.aspx. 
 
70 HERMAN, supra note 41 at, at 109-12 (listing the role of the judge in “finalizing the bargain). 
 
71.  See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 41 at 1–2. 
 
72.  For a more extensive list of possible plea bargaining outcomes, see id. at 104–06. For purposes of simplicity, this 
article will often refer to “guilty pleas” and not also include no-contest or Alford pleas. See e.g., HERMAN, supra 
note 41 at 189-91. 
 
73.  See id. at 1-2. 
 
74.  See id. 
 




Depending on the seriousness and complexity of the case, plea negotiations can be simple 
and fast or complex and drawn out. 76    Plea bargaining is often a multi-party negotiation as not 
only must the prosecutor and defense lawyer agree, but also the defendant and the judge, and in 
some cases the prosecutor’s boss.77  Victims do not have a formal role, although in many 
jurisdictions they must be informed about any plea deal.78  Police officers also have no formal 
role, and, unless they are a victim, may not be notified about the deal until after it is concluded (if 
at all). However, police officers and victims, despite the fact that they have no formal role in the 
plea negotiation, can informally exert influence over the prosecutor. 
 
Plea negotiations can be as simple as an offer from the prosecutor that is accepted by the 
defense without any counter-offers. Or the negotiation may involve the defense sharing 
information about possible defenses and possible motions (such as a search and seizure motion) 
with the goal being to persuade the prosecutor to reduce the charge or reduce the sentence or 
both.  Plea negotiations are usually conducted off the record, even if the negotiation is in open 
court. At some point the plea offer may be reduced to writing or the offer may be stated on the 
record in court.79 
 
Because plea bargaining tends to happen in private, it is harder to study and analyze than, 
















76. See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 41 at 75-87 (describing various plea bargaining tactics including “quick pleas”), 
89-109 (describing how plea negotiations are done). In simple cases—such as driving under the influence of alcohol 
or drug cases—prosecutors and defense lawyers know the “standard deal” in the individual court or jurisdiction. 
The “negotiation,” thus, often simply consists of the prosecutor stating the offer and the defense lawyer confirming 
that her client accepts the deal. See DOUGLAS W. MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA BARGAINING: THE LANGUAGE OF 
NEGOTIATION 78 (1984) (referring to these types of plea negotiations as “routine processing” Id., and at 104-07). 
 
77 For a discussion about plea bargaining as a multi-party negotiation see Alkon, supra note 47 at 413-14. 
 
78 For a general description of victims’ rights in criminal cases see About Victims’ Rights, 
https://www.victimlaw.org/victimlaw/pages/victimsRight.jsp (last visited Sept. 6, 2015).   For a recommendation of 
more victim involvement see e.g., STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 150-53 (2012). 
 
79 This has become more common after the 2012 cases of Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) and Missouri v. 
Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). For more information on the efforts to place more information on the record regarding 
plea offers post-Lafler and Frye see Alkon, supra note 10 at 617-18. 
11   
negotiation as that is something that is both easier to determine and to measure.80  There have, 
however, been studies of plea bargaining that have attempted to examine the negotiation process 
in more detail. One such study was conducted in the early 1980s and used conversational 
analysis to examine how plea bargaining worked and the skills the lawyers used while 
negotiating misdemeanor cases.81 One observation from this study was that plea negotiations 
tend to happen in “spurts and starts” in between other conversations the lawyers are having in 
court, in between the judge calling cases, and other defense lawyers trying to talk to the 
prosecutor.82  Criminal courts can be chaotic places and misdemeanor courts even more so.83 
But, unlike negotiation or mediation of civil cases which may happen far away from the formal 
trappings of the court system, plea bargaining more often happens in courtrooms and 
courthouses. 
 
One distinction in plea bargains is between those that are routine and those that are not. 
Routine plea bargains are those cases in which the prosecution and the defense agree on what the 
case is worth and “they do not ‘really negotiate.’”84  However, as Douglas Maynard noted, a case 
that is resolved without apparent negotiation “still reflects strategic and systematic negotiational 
efforts.”85  The charge, the facts, and the prior criminal record of the defendant are all a part of 
the analysis for the defense in determining whether the prosecutor’s first offer is acceptable.86  
The other type of plea negotiation is one where the defense attorney does not accept the 




80   For examples of empirical studies examining plea bargaining outcomes focused on whether the type of lawyer 
(public defender, publicly appointed private counsel or private counsel) makes a difference in case outcomes see, 
e.g., ROGER HANSON, BRIAN OSTROM, WILLIAM HEWITT, AND CHRISTOPHER LOMVARDIAS, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, INDIGENT DEFENDERS: GET THE JOB DONE AND DONE WELL (1992); James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, 
How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make?  The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 22 YALE 
L.J 154 (2012); Richard D. Harley, et.al., Do You Get What you Pay for? Type of Counsel and Its Effect on Criminal 
Court Outcomes, 38 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 1063 (2010); Morris B. Hoffman, Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, An 
Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-Selection by the “Marginally Indigent”, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 223 (2005); Radha Iyengar, An Analysis of the Performance of Federal Indigent Defense Counsel (Nat’l Bureau  
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13187, 2007), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w13187; Thomas H. 
Cohen, Who’s Better at Defending Criminals? Does type of Defense Attorney Matter in Terms of Producing 
Favorable Case Outcomes? https://ssrn.com/abstract= 1876474; Michael Roach, Explaining the Outcome Gap 
between Different Types of Indigent Defense Counsel: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Effects, (Apr. 2011), 
http:ssrn.com/abstract=1839651. 
 
81 DOUGLAS W. MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA BARGAINING: THE LANGUAGE OF NEGOTIATION, 1-4 (1984). 
 
82 Id. at 36. 
 
83 For the classic study of misdemeanor courts see generally MALCOM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE 
PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979). 
 




86 Id. at 104-07 (describing several routine plea agreements and why the fact of little discussion does not mean there 
was no negotiation). 
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that might show weaknesses in the prosecutor’s case and factors about the defendant that might 
support a more lenient penalty.88 
 
The starting point in any plea negotiation is the charges. A defense lawyer will evaluate 
whether the prosecutor has sufficient evidence to prove the charges, and if there are any 
weaknesses in the case, these weaknesses will be used to argue for a reduced charge and/or a 
reduced sentence. For example, if the charge is possession for sale of a controlled substance, the 
defense attorney may argue that the surrounding circumstances and the amount of the drug will 
make it difficult for the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs were 
possessed for sale and that, therefore, the prosecutor should reduce the charge to a simple 
possession of a controlled substance and that the penalty should also be reduced. Defense 
lawyers will also evaluate whether there are additional charges or enhancements that could be 
added that could increase the possible maximum penalty as part of deciding whether the offer is 
fair. The charge or potential charges are a key starting point because whatever crime the 
defendant is accused of violating, or could be accused of violating, is what determines the 
possible maximum penalty.89 
 
Defendants who do not accept a plea deal and instead go to trial and lose, can expect to 
get a higher sentence than they would have gotten through plea bargaining.90  This is often 
referred to as the “trial penalty” and researchers report that defendants who go to trial and are 
found guilty can receive prison sentences that are over four times higher than those who plead 
guilty.91   Stefanos Bibas explains that the “expected post-trial sentence is imposed in only a few 
percent of cases” which means it is “like the sticker price for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised 
consumer would view the full price as the norm and anything less as a bargain.”92  However, the 
 
 
87 MAYNARD supra note 79, at 107. Maynard refers to these types of plea bargains as “adversarial” although later 
studies suggest that this is not the best term as plea negotiation is often highly cooperative. For studies that look at 
negotiation styles of criminal lawyers, and found a significant percentage to be rated as “problem solvers” as 
compared to “adversarial” see Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Cooperating or Caving In: Are Defense Attorneys Shrewd 
or Exploited in Plea Negotiations? 91 MARQ. L. REV. 145 (2007); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Negotiation Myths: 
Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143 (2002). 
 
88 MAYNARD supra note 81, at 107-08. 
 
89 See e.g., JILL PAPERNO, REPRESENTING THE ACCUSED: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CRIMINAL DEFENSE, 216-18 
(2012). 
 
90 For a scathing report on how the trial penalty impacts plea bargaining in felony drug cases in the United States, see 
generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How U.S. Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants 
to Plead Guilty (Dec. 2013), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1213_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf. 
 
91 See Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench 
Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 992 (2005) (reporting trial penalties 
ranging from thirteen percent to four hundred sixty-one percent, depending on the state and the offense); Russell 
Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 213, 
at 224–30 (stating that the actual trial penalty could be substantially higher due to the fact that most statistics 
compare the sentence for similar charges and do not consider the fact that plea bargains often include pleading guilty 
to a lesser offense than the one originally charged). 
 
92 Bibas, supra note 5, at 1138. 
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fact that defendants don’t plead out to the maximum, doesn’t mean that the maximum possible 
sentence don’t anchor the plea negotiations. As will be discussed later, a defendant’s fear of a 
high maximum sentence can raise concerns of coercion in the plea bargaining process and 
innocent defendants have plead guilty to avoid the risk of trial and the potentially dramatically 
higher maximum sentence.93 
 
One empirical study looking at plea bargaining outcomes concluded that the criminal 
code mattered in terms of plea outcomes and how prosecutors bargained in particular cases.94 
The more options a prosecutor had under the law to reduce the charges, without reducing to a 
misdemeanor, the more likely they were to reduce the charges and along with that, the 
sentence.95  Ronald Wright and Rodney Engen concluded that “the substantive criminal law 
determines the outcome of the criminal process” and that plea bargaining does not mean that the 
parties “negotiate a customized outcome without regard to the legal rules.”96    Instead, the law 
creates “starting points” for the negotiation.97  One question was whether prosecutors still 
exercise wide discretion when there are sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentencing 
provisions. Wright and Engen examined previous empirical studies that found it was “clear that 
prosecutors circumvent guidelines through charge bargaining in a sizeable minority of cases.”98 
Wright and Engen also found that to be true in the data they collected. They looked at two 
factors, the “depth” and “distance” of the criminal code. The “depth” of the criminal code is 
determined by whether there are a lot, or just a few, charging options for similar facts.99  The 
“distance” is the “relative difference in the sentences that attach to the more- and less-serious 
charging options.”100  Wright and Engen found that the charges are more likely to be reduced 
when there is more depth, meaning more options for the prosecutor to choose from. It is less 
likely if there is a large distance, meaning big differences in sentences.101  This study confirmed 
that plea bargaining is not a process that takes place outside the legal system but instead is a 
process that is, as will be discussed below, framed by the substantive law.102 
 
 
93 See infra Section IV. See, e.g., Ronald Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal 
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 84-86, 100-12, 129-37, 150-54 (2005)(concluding that federal defendants who would 
have been acquitted at trial plead guilty in increasing numbers due to increased federal prosecutorial power and 
threats of large penalties for going to trial combined with much better deals for pleading guilty). 
 
94 Ronald F. Wright & Rodney Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging, 
Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1939 (2006). 
 
95 Id. at 1940. 
 




98 Id. at 1947. 
 
99 Id. at 1939. 
 
100 Id. at 1940. 
 
101 Wright, supra note 94, at 1940. 
 
102 See infra Section V. 
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Bibas observed that until 2010, when Padilla v. Kentucky103 was decided, the Supreme 
Court’s “world was binary: defendants were either guilty or not guilty” and that the Court 
“ignored the varieties of possible charges and the gradations of sentences that might fit a 
crime.”104  The substantive criminal law makes a substantial difference in terms of how plea 
bargaining works.105  Prosecutors have the power and discretion to charge any offense that the 
facts arguably support.106  Since the 1970s, legislatures in every state, and the U.S. Congress, 
have increased penalties for crimes, created new crimes, added habitual offender statutes, and 
increased sentences through enhancements for things like using a gun or committing a crime in a 
school zone.107  The changes in the substantive criminal law have given prosecutors more 
leverage in plea bargaining and made plea bargaining a much higher stakes process for 
defendants who face significantly higher sentences if they reject the plea offer.108  As was 
discussed above, thus far the Supreme Court has shown little interest in sentencing issues in plea 
bargaining in large part due to the tendency to take “trials as the norm and thus post-trial 
punishments as the normative baseline.”109  Scholars have also tended to focus more of their 
attention on better regulating the process of plea bargaining and less on the impact of the 
substantive criminal law on how plea bargaining actually works.110  However, the substantive 






103 559 U.S. 356. 
 
104 Bibas, supra note 5, at 1128. 
 
105 For another study concluding that that substantive crime “can catalyze or frustrate plea bargaining” see Kyle 
Graham, Crimes, Widgets, and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge Content, Pleas, and Trials, 100 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1573 (2012). 
 
106 HERMAN, supra note 41 at 15 ( Prosecutors are “given extraordinarily broad discretion in deciding whether to 
prosecute and what charges to bring, and this discretion is not subject to judicial intervention so long as the charges 
brought are based on probable cause and the prosecution is not facially discriminatory.” Id. See, also ALEXANDER, 
supra note 16 at 87 (discussing prosecutorial discretion and the practice of overcharging); Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 85-105 (1968) (discussing prosecutorial overcharging, 
based on interviews with prosecutors and defense attorneys in the 1960s, an example that overcharging is not a new 
practice). 
 
107 For a discussion of how these changes increase prosecutorial power see Alkon, supra note 79, at 585-87. 
 
108 See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for 
“Fixed” and “Presumptive” Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 570-71 (1978). 
 
109 Bibas, supra note 5, at 1127. However, the Court recognized that the defendant who turned down a plea deal due 
to ineffective assistance of counsel got a worse sentence after trial. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012)(“Far 
from curing the error, the trial caused the injury from the error. Even if the trial itself is free from constitutional  
flaw, the defendant who goes to trial instead of taking a more favorable plea may be prejudiced from either a 
conviction on more serious counts or the imposition of a more severe sentence.” Id. at 1386). 
 
110 For a notable exception, see Wright & Engen supra note 94. 
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IV. Concerns About Plea Bargaining 
 
Critics have expressed serious concerns for decades about how plea bargaining works and 
about the fact that it is the predominate process to resolve criminal cases in the United States. 
Those expressing concern about the heavy use of plea bargaining question whether it undermines 
our adversarial system of justice.111  There is also the concern that plea bargaining fails to give 
victims a voice112 or to offer procedural justice generally.113  Other concerns are that plea 
bargaining encourages defendants to “game” the system114 and that it leads to disparate 
sentencing.115    Critics have also looked at the overall atmosphere and expressed concern that plea 
bargaining acts as a form of torture116 and is unduly coercive.117  Some have suggested  
procedural reform to address the concern about undue coercion in plea bargaining.118  Better 
regulation of the plea bargaining process, including putting greater restrictions on prosecutorial 
hard bargaining behavior, could help to reduce the pressure placed on many defendants to plead 
guilty. However, procedural protections alone can’t fully address the problem of coercion as it is 
often the underlying criminal law, and the possibility of an extremely high penalty, that places 
pressure on defendants to accept the prosecutor’s offer.119 
 
One concern is that innocent defendants are pleading guilty due to concerns about 
possibly heavy penalties after trial. For example, seventeen percent of those exonerated in 2013 
first plead guilty to the charges.120  Overall, out of the 329 DNA exonerations nationwide, thirty- 
one (or just over nine percent) plead to the crime before being exonerated.121 This means that we 
 
 
111 See, e.g., William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
67, 80-82 (2006). 
 
112 See, e.g., STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 26, 150-53 (2012). 
 
113 See generally Michael O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407 (2008). 
 
114 See, e.g., ROBERT A. KAGEN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 85 (2001). 
 
115 See, e.g., Laurie L. Levinson, Peeking Behind the Plea Bargaining Process: Missouri v. Frye & Lafler v.Cooper, 
46 LOY. LA. L. REV. 457, 471 (2013). 
 
116 John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12 (1978). 
 
117 See, e.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice System, 61 
CATH. U. L. REV. 63 (2011). 
 
118 See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 2023, 2042-50 (2006); see also Bibas, supra note 5, at 1155-57. 
 
119 For a more detailed discussion of the overall negotiation atmosphere for plea bargaining, including bargaining 
imbalances and coercion, see Alkon supra note 10, at 594-605. 
 
120 Timothy Williams, Study Puts Exonerations at Record Level in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/us/study-puts-exonerations-at-record-level-in-us.html?_r=0. 
 
121 DNA Exonerations Nationwide, The Innocence Project (Feb. 7, 2007), http://www.innocenceproject.org/free- 
innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/dna-exonerations-nationwide. 
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know that innocent people are pleading guilty.122 One reason that innocent people may plead 
guilty is because “the offer is too good to refuse”123 which is tied to defendants evaluating the 
possible maximum compared to the plea offer.124 Innocent defendants may also be more risk 
averse than the guilty and more likely, therefore, to take deals. 125 
 
Oren Gazal-Ayal and Avishalom Tor examined whether innocent defendants are more 
likely to take deals.126  Gazal-Ayal and Tor suggested that one possible reform to lessen the 
problem of innocent defendants taking plea deals would be to place restrictions on plea offers.127 
They suggest to “limit the magnitude of plea discounts or, alternatively, or trial penalties.” 128 
The way they suggest this should be accomplished is that judges should “reject plea agreements 
that include a sentence that is significantly lower than the sentence expected following conviction 
by a jury trial.”129  Gazal-Ayal and Tor confidently predict that this will “result in plea   
rejections by those defendants who require deeper discounts in exchange for their guilty pleas” 
which will reduce the number of innocent defendants who plead guilty.130  While this might 
prevent some of the most extreme examples of hard bargaining, it will also likely result in more 
trials and more convictions and higher sentences for innocent defendants who might otherwise,  
at least, have benefitted from a reduced sentence.131  Gazal-Ayal and Tor do not                 
discuss the need to also reduce mandatory sentencing provisions, sentencing enhancements, or 
long possible maximum sentences as part of how this proposal might help to reduce the pressure 
on innocent defendants to plead guilty. As with other scholars who focus on procedural reform, 
Gazal-Ayal and Tor fail to also examine the underlying criminal law and recommend changes to 
the law in addition to the procedural changes. 
 
 
122 The overall numbers are probably higher. For a longer discussion see Alkon, supra note 10, at 601-03. 
 
123 Covey, supra note 5, at 617. 
 
124 For an article arguing that innocent defendants may get better deals and that concerns about an “innocence 
problem” in plea bargaining are “misguided,” see Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 
1117 (2008). 
 
125 For an interesting study finding that innocent people are highly likely to take plea deals, especially in the face of 
serious consequences if they reject the deal, see generally Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent 
Defendant’s Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2013). But see Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L. J. 339, 
(2012) (arguing that “innocents are significantly less likely to accept plea offers that appear attractive to similarly 
situated guilty defendants.” Id. at 339). 
 
126 Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 125, at 347. 
 
127 Id. at 395. 
 






131 Most of the exonerated were convicted by a jury trial. Simply having a trial is far from a guarantee that the 
defendant will not be convicted. See supra notes 120-122. 
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On example of how extreme possible sentences can work in the plea bargaining context is 
the case of Marissa Alexander. Ms. Alexander was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly 
weapon in Florida.132  The case started when Ms. Alexander shot her gun in the air “one time” 
during a fight with her estranged husband.133  Ms. Alexander’s defense was that on the day in 
question her husband grabbed her neck and threatened to kill her.134  The trial judge, in error, 
shifted the burden of proof in the “stand your ground” defense to Ms. Alexander during jury 
instructions.135  The jury convicted Ms. Alexander and due to the mandatory “use a gun” law136   
in Florida, Ms. Alexander was sentenced to twenty years in prison.137  Ms. Alexander’s case was 
overturned on appeal due to an error in the jury instructions and sent back for a re-trial.138 
Before her first trial the prosecution offered three years in prison in exchange for a guilty plea to 
aggravated assault (without the gun use allegation).139  Ms. Alexander rejected that deal and went 
to trial. After the appellate court ordered a re-trial, the prosecutor added additional charges of 
aggravated assault, one for each of her two children who were present, in addition to her 
estranged husband. Those additional charges made the possible maximum sentence sixty years in 
prison, as there was a mandatory twenty year “use a gun” allegation with each charge.140 
 
Ms. Alexander was faced with a decision that is all too typical. She could reject the deal 
and go to trial on what appeared to be a solid self-defense claim. However, she had already lost 
at trial (albeit with bad jury instructions). If she lost at trial again, and on all charges, she would 
be sentenced to sixty years in prison. Or she could take the three year plea deal that the 
prosecutor eventually offered again. By the time the offer was renewed, Ms. Alexander was just 
weeks away from completing the three year term.141  Defendants are regularly faced with “time- 
 
 





134 Aliyah Frumin, Marissa Alexander Accepts Plea Deal, MSNBC (Nov. 24, 2014), 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/marissa-alexander-accepts-plea-deal. 
 
135 Alexander v. State, 121 So. 3d 1185, 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 
136 FLA. STAT. §775.087.2 (2014) (“… discharged a ‘firearm’ or ‘destructive device’ as defined in s. 790.001 shall 
be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 20 years.” Id.). 
 
137 Fla. Mom Gets 20 Years for Firing Warning Shots, supra note 132 (“Under Florida’s mandatory minimum 
sentencing requirements Alexander couldn’t receive a lesser sentence, even though she has never been in trouble 
with the law before.” Id.). 
 
138 121 So. 3d 1185 at 1189. 
 
139 Julia Dahl, Fla. Woman Marissa Alexander Gets 20 Years for “Warning Shot”: Did She Stand Her Ground?, 
CBS NEWS  (May  16,  2012),  http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fla-woman-marissa-alexander-gets-20-years-for- 
warning-shot-did-she-stand-her-ground/. 
 
140 Morgan Whitaker, Marissa Alexander Could Face 60 Years, MSNBC (Mar. 3, 2014) 
http://www.msnbc.com/politicsnation/marissa-alexander-could-face-60-years (the prosecutor stated that the 
additional charges were necessary due to a change in the law. Id.). 
 
141 Frumin, supra note 134. 
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served” or nearly time-served deals or extremely high sentences if they go to trial and lose.142  As 
Ms. Alexander experienced, if she was convicted, she could expect to get the maximum. As is  
no surprise, on reflection, Ms. Alexander decided to accept the plea deal.143 What is never 
explained is why the same act would be worth three years in prison after a guilty plea, but twenty 
or sixty years after a trial, an example of a significant trial penalty of 566% to 1900%. Simply 
taking the possibility of the three-year offer off the table, as Gazal-Ayal and Tor suggest as one 
possible reform, would not have helped Ms. Alexander. She would have been forced to go to 
trial and risked another jury, even with proper instructions, convicting and sending her to prison 
for sixty years. However, if the underlying law was changed, and Ms. Alexander was looking at 
a much lower possible sentence, the risk of going to trial would be that much lower and one that 
she might have been willing to take. 
 
Ms. Alexander’s case illustrates how the substantive criminal law can be used to create a 
coercive atmosphere. Prosecutors have discretion to file charges that carry the maximum penalty 
(or not) and they can decide to add (or not) enhancement allegations, like the “use a gun” 
enhancement in Florida. However, if the law allows for these charges, it is unrealistic to assume 
that prosecutors won’t use the charges and that they won’t use them as part of their arsenal to 
secure guilty pleas.144 
 
The Marissa Alexander case highlights another problem with mandatory minimums. Although 
mandatory minimums were intended to ensure that similar acts were punished similarly, in 
reality, due to plea bargaining, mandatory minimums instead often are only used against those 
who go to trial or otherwise can’t negotiate around the mandatory sentence. There is no doubt 
that Marissa Alexander used a gun. There is a question whether the act of firing the gun was a 
criminal act (an assault). Before trial, the prosecution made plea offers that took the mandatory 
twenty years in prison for using a gun off the table. After Ms. Alexander’s conviction at her first 
trial, the judge had no choice, under the law, but to sentence her to the twenty years.145  
Mandatory minimums, either for the existing charge or through enhancements, increase the 
pressure on defendants to accept plea deals, increase the potential trial penalty, and increase the 
disparity between defendants who committed otherwise similar acts. 
 
V.  Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
 
The now classic article to examine and describe how the substantive law can impact 





142 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
 
143 Frumin, supra note 134. 
 
144 See e.g., WILLIAM STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 259 (2011) (“…these and similar 
laws granted prosecutors the power to threaten sentences that neither the enacting legislators not the prosecutors 
themselves wished to apply, all as a means of inducing guilty pleas with prosecutor’s preferred sentences attached. 
The predictable consequence was more easily induced guilty pleas and harsher sentences.” Id. at 259). 
 
145 Florida Mom Gets 20 Years for Firing Warning Shots, supra note 132. 
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cases as happening in the “shadow of the law.”146  The article concluded that there were a 
number of reasons why the substantive family law mattered in how the parties approached 
negotiating divorce, custody, and support issues. Years later, in 2004, Stefanos Bibas, critically 
analyzed plea bargaining scholarship that adopted one piece of the shadow of the law theory, the 
“shadow of trial.”147  Bibas concluded that trial outcomes are only one piece of a much more 
complex dynamic.148  Bibas argued for the need to recognize these other complexities and not 
simply look at plea bargaining behavior in the context of trial outcomes.149 In considering plea 
bargaining reform it is useful to first explore how the shadow of the law theory may explain plea 
bargaining behavior to better understand why it is also necessary to reform the substantive 
criminal law as part of any meaningful plea bargaining reform effort. 
 
A.  The Shadow of the Law: 
 
In Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, Robert Mnookin and 
Lewis Kornhausert examined how the law impacted divorce negotiations “outside the 
courtroom”150 and suggested that divorce law did not impose “order from above” but rather 
provided a “framework” for the negotiations.151  Mnookin and Kornhausert concluded that the 
existing laws on “custody, alimony, child support, and marital property are all striking for their 
lack of precision and thus provide a bargaining backdrop clouded by uncertainty.”152  However, 
this uncertainty in the law did not mean that the law was irrelevant to the negotiations. 
 
In examining how divorce negotiations worked, Mnookin and Kornhausert identified five 
factors that they concluded were important in determining the outcome of divorce negotiations. 
The five factors were: “(1) the preferences of the divorcing parents; (2) the bargaining 
endowments created by legal rules that indicate the particular allocation a court will impose if the 
parties fail to reach agreement; (3) the degree of uncertainty concerning the legal outcome if 
the parties go to court, which is linked to the parties’ attitudes towards risk; (4) transaction costs 
and the parties’ respective abilities to bear them; and (5) strategic behavior.”153 
 
Mnookin and Kornhausert discussed how the substantive law can impact these factors. 




146 Mnookin & Kornhausert, supra note 28. 
 
147 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004). 
 
148 Id. at 2469. 
 
149 Id. at 2470-2486. 
 




152 Id. at 969. 
 
153 Id. at 966. 
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to a “maternal-preference rule” or a “joint custody rule” it changes the bargaining power of each 
parent.154  Under a rule where mothers are presumed to get custody, fathers will have relatively 
little bargaining power.155  Likewise, rules that give fathers more equality in custody, particularly 
when combined with laws that limit alimony, give fathers more bargaining power.156 
 
Mnookin and Kornhausert looked at the impact that changes in the law may have on 
whether the parties reach an agreement. The example that they gave is a proposal to give the 
custodial parent, whoever it might be, the exclusive right to determine when the non-custodial 
parent can visit, if at all and joint custody would not be a possibility.157  The problem with a rule 
like this, as Mnookin and Kornhausert explained, is that it makes it harder for divorcing parents 
to agree on custody and reach “initial agreement” as this proposed rule would prevent the parties 
from agreeing to promises regarding visitation beyond who has custody.158 
 
Under Mnookin and Kornhausert’s analysis, the shadow of the law in the context of 
divorce cases exists in two pieces: the applicable legal codes and how the courts might decide 
any divorce case that fails to settle. In looking at the how the law influenced divorce 
negotiations, Mnookin and Kornhausert used as a reference point what the courts might do and 
the fact that any divorce case that is not settled through negotiation will go to trial.159 
 
B. Does the Shadow of the Law Theory Apply to Plea Bargaining? 
 
Twenty five years after the Shadow of the Law was published, Stephanos Bibas criticized 
applying Mnookin and Kornhauser’s second piece of the analysis, how the courts might decide a 
case, to the plea bargaining context.160 Bibas took issue with scholars who looked at “plea 
bargaining as just another case of bargaining in the shadow of expected trial outcomes.”161 Bibas, 
concluded that the “shadow-of-trial” model was “far too simplistic” when looking at the 
relationship between criminal trials and plea bargains.162  Bibas defined the “shadow of trials” to 
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mean “the influence exerted by the strength of the evidence and expected punishment after 
trial.”163  Bibas concluded that plea bargaining is more complex as there are “structural 
impediments that distort bargaining” such as bad lawyers, the rules surrounding bail, and 
mandatory sentences.164  The second big problem, according to Bibas, with applying a shadow of 
trials theory is that it “assumes that the actors are fundamentally rational” in plea bargaining.165 
 
Bibas briefly examines the impact that the legal framework has on plea bargaining, but 
not as Mnookin and Kornhausert did. In the Shadow of the Law, Mnookin and Kornhausert 
discuss not just trial outcomes, but how the substantive law of divorce impacts or could impact, 
divorce negotiations. Bibas, by focusing on trial outcomes, gives little attention to the first 
question: how much does the substantive legal framework impact plea bargaining? Bibas 
rightly points out that trial outcomes are not as important as a shadow of trials theory might 
suggest in the specific context of plea bargaining as there are many other factors that influence 
bargaining behavior. In doing so, Bibas recognizes the importance of the substantive criminal 
law in terms of mandatory sentences and sentencing guidelines that contribute to the “structural 
skewing of bargains.” 166  As Bibas explains it, mandatory sentencing guidelines and mandatory 
minimums make it so that punishment is no longer “calibrated” to the “strength of the evidence” 
as these statutory provisions “act as sledgehammers” that crash down on defendants if the crime 
was committed under certain circumstances, regardless of the severity of the criminal act.167 
Bibas concludes that the inflexibility of the substantive criminal law impacts plea bargaining and 
examines how it might encourage cooperation from defendants to get better deals as defendants 
will “look for ways to smooth out the sharp peaks and valleys” of the substantive laws.168 
 
Mnookin and Kornhausert’s conclusion that the divorce law provides the framework for 
divorce negotiations is equally applicable in plea bargaining. As with divorce cases, the 
substantive criminal law creates “bargaining endowments” for the prosecution and gives them far 
greater power in plea negotiations. Marissa Alexander’s case illustrates how an extreme possible 
sentence can give the prosecutor power in the bargaining process to pressure a defendant to 
accept the deal or face the high sentence. For many laws, such as the mandatory use-a-gun laws 
in Florida, the legal outcome is not uncertain if the defendant is convicted: the defendant will get 
the mandatory minimum. There is a degree of uncertainty in how a jury may see an offered 
defense and whether they will vote to acquit. In such situations, Mnookin and Kornhausert 
discussed that the decision of whether to negotiate a settlement or not will depend on the how the 
parties view risk.169  There is a serious concern that innocent defendants may be more risk averse 
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than the guilty and more likely, therefore, to take deals, especially if the potential consequences 
of losing at trial are more serious.170  Mnookin and Kornhausert also point to the transaction 
costs and the parties willingness to bear them as one of the factors influencing bargaining 
behavior in divorce cases.171  As with the above factors, defendants are often at a serious 
disadvantage as the transaction costs of not taking the deal can include the general 
unpleasantness of making court appearances and the possibility of spending more time in 
custody awaiting their trial than the time-served deal.172 
 
While any single theory explaining plea bargaining (or any form of negotiation) will 
undoubtedly over-simplify the analysis of how the process works, it is still useful to analyze 
whether the shadow of the law applies to plea bargaining. One of Bibas’ concerns about the 
focus on the shadow of trial theory is that by doing so scholars failed to look critically enough at 
how plea bargaining works and the need for reform.173  As Bibas said, if trials are the “backstop” 
to plea bargaining then “we do not need new procedural safeguards for pleas because plea 
outcomes already incorporate the value of trial safeguards.”174    However, it is precisely because 
of the complexities of plea bargaining that it is important to understand the variety of factors that 
influence bargaining behavior, particularly if the goal is to reform plea bargaining. One of the 
factors that exerts a strong influence in the parties bargaining behavior in plea negotiations is the 
substantive criminal law. Therefore it is important to not only look to what additional law or 
regulation may help improve the plea bargaining process, but to also not overlook the importance 
of reforming the underlying criminal law as a part of reforming plea bargaining. 
 
VI. Reforming Plea Bargaining After Lafler and Frye: 
 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has decided few cases on plea bargaining and 
even fewer that place limits on the plea bargaining process. Therefore, the 2012 cases of Lafler 
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new era and would have a “significant effect.”177    As I have written elsewhere these cases are 
likely to have a much more limited impact.178  However, these cases, have sparked renewed 
scholarly interest in plea bargaining and may spark renewed efforts to reform plea bargaining. 
 
Nationwide, there is a growing interest in criminal justice reform that cuts across partisan 
political lines.179  Much of the interest is focused on decreasing high incarceration rates.180  This 
interest is not limited to academics, but instead includes legislators and has already involved 
some significant changes in state criminal laws. For example, the Sentencing Project reported 
that in 2014 alone “at least 30 states and the District of Columbia authorized a range of law 
changes and policies that may address the nation’s scale of incarceration.”181  Although these 
legislative changes are aimed at decreasing incarceration rates they may have a significant 
impact on how plea bargaining works. If done right, legislative reforms aimed at reducing 
incarceration rates could also help to significantly lessen the often coercive atmosphere in plea 
bargaining. 
 
California is an example of a state that has restructured its criminal law to reduce possible 
sentences and to reduce some offenses from felonies to misdemeanors. These new laws were not 
intended to reform plea bargaining, but were instead intended to decrease incarceration rates in 
the state.182  Over-crowding in California prisons is so serious that the state has been under a 
continuing federal court order, since 2009, to reduce its prison population.183 The first significant 
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change in the California Penal Code was Proposition 36, which passed in 2012, and amended the 
three-strikes law.184  Previously, any defendant convicted of any new felony, if they had two  
prior convictions for serious and violent felonies, faced a sentence of twenty-five years to life.185 
This meant that if a defendant had two prior convictions for residential burglary and was 
convicted on a drug possession, or petty theft with a prior, that defendant would be sentenced to 
twenty-five years to life in prison, unless the case was plea bargained for less.186  Proposition 36 
changed the law by requiring that the new criminal case also be a serious or violent felony. 
Proposition 36 also included a retroactivity clause, allowing up to 3000 defendants sentenced 
under the old law to be resentenced.187 
 
To date, it is not clear how this change in law has changed, or not, plea bargaining 
practices in California. Under both the old and new law, prosecutors have discretion to file cases 
as three-strike cases and to “strike strikes” as part of the plea bargaining process. This meant that 
some cases that could be three-strike cases were reduced in plea bargaining to second-strike 
cases. For example, a typical three-strike of possession for sale of one rock of crack cocaine 
alleged as a three-strike case under the old law due to two prior strike offenses could have been 
reduced in plea bargaining. The prosecution could offer to reduce the case to a second-strike  
case with a sentence of eight years in prison (compared to twenty-five to life). Defendants who 
were facing twenty-five to life sentences often jumped at the opportunity to take those reduced 
sentences. Proposition 36 prevents prosecutors from threatening to add strikes, or offering to take 
them away, when the new criminal case is not a serious or violent felony. The change in law 
took away one significant category of possible mandatory minimum sentences and therefore, 
possibly, one opportunity for prosecutors to threaten higher sentences if a defendant did not take 
the plea deal. One of the problems with three-strike cases is that they were often “no offer” 
cases, which means the prosecutor refused to make an offer, often due to office-wide policies.188 
As with other charges, prosecutors can exercise wide discretion on how to handle three strikes 
cases from the initial charging decisions to the decision of whether to offer a plea bargain. There 
are no studies yet analyzing the impact of Proposition 36 on plea bargaining in California. The 
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The second change in the law in California is potentially even more far-reaching. 
Proposition 47 passed in November, 2014, and reduced some felonies to misdemeanors, 
including drug and property crimes.189 It also allowed those who have already been sentenced 
to be re-sentenced under the new law.190  It is still too early to evaluate the long-term impact. 
The initial reports seem to suggest that there will be fewer arrests. The old law, as one Deputy 
Public Defender in Los Angeles, Russell Griffith remarked, “….gave the cops an enormously 
strong incentive to arrest people because they were cheap statistics.”191  Early reports are that 
arrests are down dramatically for narcotics offenses which are no longer felonies.192  Overall, in 
Los Angeles County, narcotics arrests decreased by 30% and overall bookings into the Los 
Angeles County Jail were down by 23% since the adoption of Proposition 47.193  The decrease in 
arrests has meant that county jail inmates now serve more of their time as the need for early 
release due to over-crowding has decreased.194  It is unclear what impact Proposition 47 may be 
having on plea bargaining. For example, are prosecutors decreasing county jail time offers due to 
the understanding that an inmate will serve more time on a sixty day sentence than they did in the 
past? 
 
Another question is what will be the fate of problem-solving courts, such as drug courts, 
in the wake of this change in law? Possession of controlled substances is now a misdemeanor. 
Without the threat of a felony conviction, at least some prosecutors are worried that defendants 
will no longer agree to drug rehabilitation or other treatment as part of a sentence, particularly as 
the possible sentences are now dramatically lower. As one Los Angeles County District 
Attorney observed, in such cases, defendants serve little time in the county jail and in “just a few 
minutes and they’re out. You have removed that leverage” of the higher possible sentence.195 
 
Removing that kind of leverage could make a significant difference in how plea 
bargaining works, at least in terms of potentially coercive prosecutorial plea bargaining behavior. 
Proposition 47 removes the option to file certain offenses as felonies. As Wright and Engen 
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observed in their study, prosecutors are less likely to reduce charges to a misdemeanor.196 John 
Pfaff, who has done extensive empirical work to better understand the causes of mass 
incarceration in the United States, concludes that the increase in incarceration in the 1990s and 
2000s was “driven almost entirely by change in precisely one part of the criminal justice chain— 
the prosecutor’s decision to file a felony claim.”197  Removing this option may help to not only 
reduce incarceration rates overall, but may also help to limit or restrict prosecutors using the 
potential of harsher charges and penalties as pressure in the plea negotiation process, for at least 
some categories of crimes. 
 
California’s reforms may influence other states to take similar actions. The key questions 
for future research include not only whether incarceration rates decrease, but also whether the 
changes in the law cause changes in plea bargaining and prosecutorial behavior. Are prosecutors 
filing a lower percentage of cases because they can only file them as misdemeanors?198 Are trial 
rates increasing? Increasing trial rates would be one indicator that the pressure to plead guilty has 
reduced, although arguably an outcome that none of the professionals in the criminal justice 
system would be anxious to see.199  Careful study of the impact of these changes in the specific 
context of plea bargaining, could help to understand what reforms of the underlying criminal law 




As Malcom M. Feeley observed, during an earlier era when many were calling for plea 
bargaining reform, “[r]eforms that focus exclusively on one narrow problem without seeing it in 
the context of the entire system may generate unanticipated consequences even less desirable 
than the status quo.”200  In fairness, plea bargaining critics in this era who call for procedural 
reforms are often doing so in ways that are far-reaching and not focused on narrow problems. 
However, as this article has discussed, they tend to do so without including recommendations to 
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penalties, combined with prosecutors having the discretionary power to charge the same act as a 
felony or misdemeanor and to add a variety of sentencing enhancements, contribute to what is 
often a highly coercive atmosphere in plea bargaining. Plea bargaining is a form of negotiation 
that most certainly does not exist outside the law, but is instead a process framed by the 
underlying criminal law. Reformers need to recognize this key part of how plea bargaining 
works and move beyond focusing primarily on procedural reform to include broader discussions 
of criminal code reform as part of any effort to reform plea bargaining. 
